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 The paper focuses on Article 1045 of the Maltese Civil Code 
regulating liquidation of compensation (damages) under Maltese tort law 
and examines whether or not compensation for moral damage is 
compatible therewith. French law and Austrian law (being the main 
sources of Article 1045) are analysed and contrasted with the 
peculiarities of Maltese tort law whilst the motivations of the original 
                                                                                                             
*  This paper is based on the author’s LL.D. thesis entitled The Rationale 
for Excluding Moral Damages from the Maltese Civil Code: A Historical and 
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legislator (Sir Adriano Dingli) are also critically discussed. The paper 
subsequently examines the dichotomy between responsibility in tort and 
damages under Maltese tort law and concludes by analysing some 




 Les larmes ne se monnaient pas goes one of the sayings for 
rejecting what is known in civil law countries as dommage moral and in 
common law countries as a “non-pecuniary loss” or a “non-economic 
loss.”1 If the loss is one which can be easily measurable in monetary 
terms, almost all legal systems throughout the world agree that 
compensation is due. Having said that, acceptance of “dommage moral”2 
or “non-pecuniary loss”3 is not universal. “Moral damage” is generally 
understood to encompass the pain suffered by the victim or the victim’s 
family for crimes or torts against the life, health, honesty, integrity or 
emotional well-being of the victim and is generally difficult to calculate 
in monetary terms.4 Munkman refers to moral damage as including “pain 
and suffering, both physical and mental; loss of the pleasures of life; 
actual shortening of life; and at least in some cases, mere discomfort and 
inconvenience . . . ”5 
 In Malta, barring recent legislative proposals which might 
introduce limited forms of compensation for moral damage in the 
Maltese Civil Code in certain specific instances,6 and the presence of 
such compensation scattered in specific branches of law,7 the core 
provisions of Maltese tort law have never really developed beyond 
certain basic principles introduced in the Nineteenth Century8 and to 
                                                                                                             
1.  “Tears do not permit calculation in money.” 
2.  As opposed to “dommage matériel.” 
3.  As opposed to “pecuniary losses.” 
4.  ROSA MARIA ABDELNOUR GRANADOS, LA RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL 
DERIVADA DEL HECHO PUNIBLE 330-358 (Editorial Juricentro, 1984).  
5.  JOHN MUNKMAN, DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURIES AND DEATH 62 
(1938). 
6.  Including in particular, Article 1046 of the Maltese Civil Code (which 
is not discussed in this paper). 
7.  Namely: Human Rights cases, the Consumer Affairs Act (Chapter 378 
of the Laws of Malta), the Press Act (Chapter 248 of the Laws of Malta), the 
Promises of Marriage Law (Chapter 5 of the Laws of Malta), and the 
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (Regulation) Act (Chapter 488 of 
the Laws of Malta). 
8. Which were in turn heavily reliant upon Roman law principles. 




date, claiming compensation for moral damage explicitly is seemingly 
generally precluded. However, the question is whether or not there is 
more to this issue than at first meets the eye. 
 The origins of Article 10459 of the Maltese Civil Code can be 
traced back to Ordinance No. VII of 186810 which regulated delicts and 
quasi-delicts. This was the work of Sir Adriano Dingli who was 
appointed crown advocate general on December 27, 1853 and who was 
tasked with the drafting of several Ordinances which would eventually 
constitute the Maltese Civil Code. It is apparent that in drafting the 
provisions regulating delicts and quasi-delicts (or torts and quasi-torts), 
Dingli was greatly influenced by the Code Napoléon, but as shall be seen 
below, this was not the only source used.11 
 The Napoleonic Code or Code Napoléon was established under 
Napoléon I.12 It was drafted by a commission of four eminent jurists and 
entered into force on March 21, 1804. The Code, with its stress on 
clearly written and accessible law, was a major step in establishing the 
rule of law and historians have called it “one of the few documents 
which have influenced the whole world.”13 
                                                                                                             
 
9.  At the time of writing, Article 1045 states as follows:  
(1) The damage which is to be made good by the person 
responsible in accordance with the foregoing provisions shall 
consist in the actual loss which the act shall have directly 
caused to the injured party, in the expenses which the latter 
may have been compelled to incur in consequence of the 
damage, in the loss of actual wages or other earnings, and in 
the loss of future earnings arising from any permanent 
incapacity, total or partial, which the act may have caused. 
(2) The sum to be awarded in respect of such incapacity 
shall be assessed by the Court, having regard to the 
circumstances of the case, and, particularly, to the nature and 
degree of incapacity caused, and to the condition of the injured 
party. 
10.    “[E]nacted to amend and consolidate the laws concerning the rights 
relative to property, and the different modes of acquiring and transmitting it.” 
GEORGE ALFRED PAGE, A GUIDE TO THE LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF MALTA. 
57 (1868). 
11.   Arturo Mercieca, Sir Adriano Dingli [Part II] sommo statista, 
legislatore, magistrato. (Continuazione), 1:4 MELITA HISTORICA: J. OF THE 
MALTA HIST. SOC. 221-260 (1955). 
12.    Originally called Code civil des Français. 
13.    ROBERT B. HOLTMAN, THE NAPOLEONIC REVOLUTION (Louisiana 
State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1981). 




 “Delicts” and “quasi-delicts” are dealt with in Book III, Title IV, 
Chapter II of the Code Napoléon and are regulated by merely five 
articles.14 The provision that basically governs the entire law of tort in 
France today is contained in Article 1382 of the Code civil which has 
remained identical to the words found in the Code Napoléon. This article 
states, “Any act committed by a person which causes damage to another 
obliges that person by whose fault it occurred to make reparation.”15 It is 
clear that in terms of delictual responsibility, this provision is very 
similar to the Maltese equivalent, In fact, Article 1031 of the Maltese 
Civil Code, provides that “Every person . . . shall be liable for the 
damage which occurs through his fault.” This general fault-based 
liability is defined in Article 1032 of the Maltese Civil Code which 
states: 
(1) A person shall be deemed to be in fault if, in his own 
acts, he does not use the prudence, diligence, and 
attention of a bonus paterfamilias. 
Under both legal systems, the elements of damage, fault and the causal 
link between them are necessary preconditions for any successful action 
in tort. It is important to note that moral damage is completely absent 
from the French text, despite its being so similar to the Maltese 
equivalent. Having said that, although the French text remained to a large 
extent unchanged in the Code civil, the interpretation given to the law 
clearly came to include what is now known as dommage moral or 
similarly, préjudice moral. 
 There is no doubt that when Sir Adriano Dingli was drafting the 
Maltese provisions in question, such interpretations had already surfaced. 
As early as 1833, the French Cour de Cassation established that the 
words of Article 138216 were sufficiently general to allow compensation 
to be awarded for dommage moral.17 It is said by some that the case, 
which dealt with the grief of a family upon the death of one of the family 
members, might not have been directly supported in the travaux 
préparatoires which might mean that the authors thereof only had 
                                                                                                             
14.     CODE NAPOLÉON art. 1382-1386 (Paris, 1807). 
 15.  Translated from: “Tout fait quelconque de l'homme, qui cause à autrui 
un dommage, oblige celui par la faute duquel il est arrivé, à le réparer.” 
16.    Imposing a liability to make reparation upon anyone causing another a 
“dommage” in general. 
17.    Cour de Cassation [Cass.] June 15, 1833, Bull. Civ. (Fr.), S.1833. 
I.458. 




material damage in mind.18 However, Mazeaud and Tunc,write that since 
there was an absence in the French provisions of an express exclusion of 
dommage moral, then its acceptance by the old pre-code law could be 
relied on.19 Even Pothier himself–the père du Code civil–who is said to 
have cut-off from Justinian doctrine, defined “délit20 in a wide enough 
manner to include moral damage within it.21 There is ample evidence that 
the dommage mentioned by Pothier was wide enough to include even 
dommage moral. The Maltese courts themselves, as early as 1909, were 
quoting Laurent and other influential commentators who were of this 
opinion and were taking it as a fact that moral damage was included in 
Article 1382 of the French Civil Code.22 
 Today, there is no doubt that French law accepts compensation 
for moral damage. The réparation du dommage moral is a concept that 
has been commented upon by numerous authors.23 Some of these define 
the so-called “préjudice moral” (as opposed to a préjudice matériel) as 
being “celui qui atteint le monde immatériel, incorporel, des pensées et 
des sentiments.”24 
 These authors however, admit that the notion of “moral damage” 
needs further explanation and some say that a préjudice moral refers to 
                                                                                                             
18.   See MAZEAUD & TUNC, 1 TRAITÉ THÉORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE LA 
RESPONSIBILITÉ CIVILE DÉLICTUELLE ET CONTRACTUELLE 301 (5th ed., 1957-
1960). 
19.   See MAZEAUD & TUNC, supra note 18, at 299, 302.  
20.   “On appelle délit le fait par lequel une personne, par dol ou malignité, 
cause du dommage ou quelque tort à une autre.  Le quasi-délit est le fait par 
lequel une personne, sans malignité, mais par une imprudence qui n’est pas 
excusable, cause quelque tort à un autre.” 
21.   ROBERT JOSEPH POTHIER, 1:1 TRAITÉ DES OBLIGATIONS §2, 158 
(1761). 
22.   See Cini v. Townsley, discussed in Part II, infra.  
23.   See e.g., ARMAND DORVILLE, DE L’INTÉRÊT MORAL DANS LES 
OBLIGATIONS (1901); ANDRÉ MANTELET, RÉPARATION DU PRÉJUDICE MORAL 
(1907). See also, MARCEL PLANIOL & GEORGES RIPERT, 6:1 TRAITÉ PRATIQUE 
DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS: OBLIGATIONS 753 (2d ed., 1952) (where Planiol and 
Ripert confirm that as long as the damage is personal, direct and certain, the 
following can be stated: “Toute espèce de préjudice lésant un intérêt protégé par 
le droit justifie une action en justice, qu’il touche la personne ou le biens, qu’il 
soit matériel ou moral, susceptible ou non d’une évaluation exacte en argent.”). 
24.   HENRI MAZEAUD, JEAN MAZEAUD, LÉON MAZEAUD & FRANÇOIS 
CHABAS, 2:1 LEÇONS DE DROIT CIVIL: OBLIGATIONS, THÉORIE GÉNÉRALE 422 
(9th ed., Montchrestien, 1998). 




“celui qui ne se traduit point par une perte en argent, parce qu’il porte 
atteinte à un droit extrapatrimonial.”25 
 It is important to note that moral damage is not all treated in the 
same manner in France. Since the concept has been refined over the 
years, we find various categories of moral damage in France including 
pretium doloris (or “psychological suffering”), préjudice esthétique (or 
“disfigurement”) and préjudice d’agrément more generally (meaning 
“deprivation of the pleasures of life”).26 In Malta, for reasons explained 
below, it seems that no such developments can take place unless the law 
is amended. 
 The words in respect of “tortuous responsibility” and “fault” 
more specifically, are very similar to the Maltese equivalent, and it is a 
fact that Maltese law contains no express exclusion of moral damage,27 
so the question is why damages cannot be awarded explicitly under the 
Maltese Civil Code to compensate moral harm The answer, it seems, lies 
in the fact that Maltese law contains additional provisions inserted by Sir 
Adriano Dingli which are not found in French law. These “additional 
provisions” deal with damages, and in this author’s opinion, actually 
dilute the civil law nature of the provisions on responsibility in tort.28 
Unlike the provisions on delictual responsibility, the provisions on 
damages in Maltese law, (including Article 1046 which is not discussed 
in this paper) seem to function very much on a common law basis in the 
sense that the Maltese courts do not usually grant any compensation 
unless a particular type of damage falls within the classes of 
compensable damage contemplated therein.29  
 English law is very different to the general fault-based system 
found in Maltese law dealing with delictual responsibility. English law 
recognises a large number of specially designated torts such as trespass, 
negligence, nuisance and defamation. In this respect, it is the Maltese 
provisions on “damages” which seem to function on a similar basis. The 
Maltese courts’ own reference to British case law may of course, be the 
reason why the provisions function this way, but it may be argued that 
Adriano Dingli himself may have been more influenced by the British 
                                                                                                             
25.    Id. Emphasis added. 
26.    See GENEVIÈVE VINEY & PATRICE JOURDAIN, TRAITÉ DE DROIT CIVIL, 
LES CONDITIONS DE LA RESPONSABILITÉ 39-66 (3RD ED., 2006).   
27.    Just like French law. 
28.    MALTA CIV. CODE art. 1045, 1046 (2011), available at 
http://www.justiceservices.gov.mt/DownloadDocument.aspx?app=lom&itemid
=8580&l=1 (Last visited December 9, 2011).  
29.   Which are clearly rooted in the civil law tradition. 




rule in Malta than one might realise.30 Moreover, the idea of regulating 
specific categories of moral injuries such as in case of a breach of the 
Promises of Marriage Law31 or else of Press Law32 is clearly a common 
law practice and the Ordinances that grant compensation for moral 
damage in these specific instances must also be studied on the basis of 
this premise.33 
 As was mentioned above, the notion of damage was not 
regulated specifically in the Code Napoléon (and still is not today), so 
Adriano Dingli must have drawn inspiration elsewhere in this regard. 
Dingli’s own appunti state that this “influence” was not derived from 
French law or even English law but Austrian law.34 It is therefore time to 
examine the domestic text dealing with damages, in light of the Austrian 
provisions cited by Dingli himself. 
 
II. THE ORIGINAL DOMESTIC TEXT AND AUSTRIAN LAW 
 
 In Adriano Dingli’s appunti, one finds an index of the provisions 
he introduced. Adjacent to these provisions, one finds a short description 
of the sources used (as well as some general remarks). The daunting 
question here is why Dingli felt the need to exclude reference to moral 
damage from Maltese tort law, when it appears that the Austrian 
provisions he was using as a reference, permitted the awarding of 
damages for “suffering”—at least in certain limited instances. This is 
what shall be examined in this section. 
 The modern Article 1045 of the Maltese Civil Code was 
originally split into two articles: Article 751 and Article 752 of 
Ordinance No. VII of 1868 (also referred to as the “Ordinance” 
hereinafter).35 The former dealt with damnum emergens whilst the latter 
with lucrum cessans. 
 
                                                                                                             
30.    As evidenced in the cases cited infra. 
31.    LAWS OF MALTA ch. 5 (1834), available at 
http://www.justiceservices.gov.mt/lom.aspx?pageid=27&mode=chrono (Last 
visited November 9, 2011). 
32.    Which is today embodied in the Press Act of the Laws of Malta. Id. at 
ch. 248. 
33.    This issue is explained in great detail by the author in the paper 
entitled MORAL DAMAGES OUTSIDE THE AMBIT OF THE MALTESE 
CIVIL CODE, ID-DRITT VOLUME XXI, 109-139, (GħSL–the University of 
Malta’s Law Students’ Society, 2011).  
34.    ADRIANO DINGLI, APPUNTI DI SIR ADRIANO DINGLI 59.   
35.    See MALTA CIV. CODE, supra note 9 & 28, at art. 1045. 




A. Damnum Emergens 
 
 Article 751 of Ordinance No. VII of 1868 states as follows: 
Il danno che dev’ essere risarcito da colui il quale lo 
abbia recato senza dolo, consiste nella perdita reale che 
il fatto abbia direttamente cagionato al danneggiato; 
nelle spese che questo abbia in consequenza del danno 
dovuto fare; e, se il danneggiato e` una persona che 
lavora per salario o altro pagamento, nella perdita ancora 
di tale guadagno.36 
Very basically, damnum emergens, as dealt with in this article, are those 
actual losses incurred as a result of the injury sustained. It is a well-
known fact that Maltese courts have generally restricted damnum 
emergens to pecuniary losses that can be easily quantified and have 
almost never explicitly included moral damage under this heading.37 The 
words senza dolo (without malice) in the original text indicate that in 
cases of culpable negligence, only damnum emergens could be claimed 
whereas in those cases where the person who caused the damage did so 
intentionally or maliciously, even lucrum cessans could be claimed. In 
respect of the type of damages that could be claimed under damnum 
emergens at the time back then, the situation is more or less similar to the 
position today. Article 751 indicated that the damage shall consist:  
1) “. . . nella perdita reale che il fatto abbia direttamente 
cagionato al danneggiato.”  
This translates almost identically into the wording of the modern Article 
1045: “ . . . the actual loss which the act shall have directly caused to the 
injured party . . .” 
 It can be argued that basing ourselves purely on the wording of 
the law, it might be difficult to understand why a moral damage should 
                                                                                                             
36.    Translated into English as follows:  
The damage that has to be made good for by whoever caused it 
without malice consists in the actual loss which the act shall 
have directly caused to the injured party, in the expenses that 
that the latter may have been compelled to incur as a result of 
the damage caused and if the injured party is a person who 
works for a salary or other payment, in the loss of such 
earnings. 
37.    The reader is advised to refer to the author’s thesis for more detail on 
this issue. See Micallef-Grimaud, Excluding Moral Damages, supra star-
footnote. 




be excluded from this “actual loss.” With respect to the concept of a 
perdita reale the Maltese courts have always understood an “actual loss” 
to be a material or economic loss and nothing more.38 By way of 
example, harm caused to movable or immovable property would usually 
lead to depreciation in value of the said property, and such “actual loss,” 
if directly caused by the act in question, can be compensated under this 
heading. This contrasts sharply with the recent innovations that have 
taken place outside the ambit of the Civil Code.39 
 Having said the above, in the recent judgment Linda Busuttil et 
v. Dr. Josie Muscat et40 the Court addressed this issue (among others) 
and indicated that the term actual loss found in Article 1045 (as well as 
the term any damage found in Article 1033 of the Civil Code)41 can no 
longer be interpreted as referring solely to patrimonial damage and must 
therefore encompass damage of all kinds,42 including non-patrimonial 
damage. In this particular case dealing with a physical injury (a facial 
scar on a female victim)43 resulting from an unsuccessful medical 
intervention, the plaintiff was awarded €5,000 in compensation for moral 
damage, calculated on an arbitrio boni viri basis. This judgment has been 
                                                                                                             
38.    Id. 
39.    Especially in the realm of Intellectual Property Law where in one 
particular legislative provision (Article 12 of Enforcement of Intellectual 
Property Rights (Regulation) Act [Chapter 488 of the Laws of Malta]) “moral 
prejudices” seem   to   be   included   under   “actual prejudices.”   Enforcement  
of       Intellectual       Property       Rights     Act ,     in     LAWS     OF     MALTA  
ch. 488 art. 12 (2006), available at 
http://www.justiceservices.gov.mt/DownloadDocument.aspx?app=lom&itemid
=8954&l=1 (Last visited November 7, 2011).  The author has his doubts on the 
consciousness of such innovations and believes that this is more a case of strict 
adherence to European Union directives and regulations rather than anything 
else. The Directive in question is Directive 2004/48/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of April 29, 2004 on the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights which is transposed almost word-for-word into 
Chapter 488 of the Laws of Malta. 
40.   Linda Busuttil et v. Dr. Josie Muscat et, First Hall (Civil Court 2011). 
41.   Article 1033 states as follows: “Any person who, with or without 
intent to injure, voluntarily or through negligence, imprudence, or want of 
attention, is guilty of any act or omission constituting a breach of the duty 
imposed by law, shall be liable for any damage resulting therefrom.” 
42.    “Ħsara” in Maltese. 
43.    A category of injuries which has generally been treated in a particular 
manner by the Maltese courts as illustrated infra. 




appealed and it therefore remains to be seen whether or not the principles 
enshrined therein will be confirmed or rejected by the Court of Appeal.44  
2) “ . . . nelle spese che questo abbia in consequenza del 
danno dovuto fare . . .” 
As the reader will note, this is also almost identical to its modern-day 
equivalent: “ . . . in the expenses which the latter may have been 
compelled to incur in consequence of the damage . . . ” 
 This refers to expenses such as necessary repairs after one’s 
property sustains damage. While the expenses of repairing the said 
property fall under this sub-heading, the reduction in value of the same 
(which in most cases can never return to its former state) is an actual loss 
as seen above. The courts resort to many principles in compensating, 
such as developing the rule that the victim should try to minimize 
expenses, as far as possible, that the person who committed the tort will 
have to pay. 
 Medical expenses for physical injuries are also recoverable under 
this heading (excluding any claims for “pain and suffering” caused by 
the injuries). Expenses for the treatment of psychological injuries (as 
distinguished from compensation for the injury itself) would also 
theoretically be recoverable under damnum emergens. 
3) “ . . . e, se il danneggiato e` una persona che lavora 
per salario o altro pagamento, nella perdita ancora di tale 
guadagno.” 
The third category of damages that could be claimed originally is also 
similar to what may be claimed today under Article 1045: “ . . . in the 
loss of actual wages or other earnings . . . ” 
 The well-known case Butler v. Heard,45 dealing with a street 
collision between two vehicles, effectively laid down the basic formula 
for calculating such damages (which goes beyond the scope of this 
paper). It suffices to say that such formulae give rise to certain problems 
under this heading just like they do under the lucrum cessans heading (as 
discussed below). 
 The notion of “loss of wages” under damnum emergens can 
merge with lucrum cessans (“loss of future profits”) unless some sort of 
dividing line is drawn. In the case Shaw v. Aquilina46 it was concluded 
that the reference to a loss of “actual or other earnings” in Article 1045, 
                                                                                                             
44.   The appeal was registered on December 16, 2010.  
45.    Court of Appeal (Civil, Superior 1967). 
46.    Court of Appeal (Civil, Superior 1996) (per J. Said Pullicino, Carmel 
A. Agius & J. D. Camilleri). 




can be deemed wide enough to include loss of actual profits until the 
date of the judgment. Profits that could be lost in the future47 are deemed 
to fall under lucrum cessans (discussed infra). In Malta, damnum 
emergens are usually easily proved and very often, compensation under 
this heading is awarded without any contestation from any of the parties.  
 Alongside Article 751 dealing with damnum emergens, Dingli 
wrote: 
“Austr. 1293, 1323 a 1325 con modif.” 
As confirmed by local case law, Article 751 was derived almost entirely 
from Austrian law as amended by Adriano Dingli himself.48  Private law 
in Austria is divided into general private law–applicable to all persons–
and specialised forms of civil law–applicable only to certain categories, 
such as commercial law for businessmen or employment law for 
employers and employees. The major part of what is considered “general 
private law” is regulated in a comprehensive private law code called the 
Allgemeine Buergerliche Gesetzbuch (“ABGB”). It is interesting to note 
that ever since Dingli referred to the laws contained in the ABGB, very 
little has changed. In fact, the provisions he quoted have remained almost 
identical. Let us look at the laws cited by Dingli. 
 Article 1293 (ABGB) is the first article to deal with “damage”49 
whilst Articles 1323 and 1324 (ABGB) deal with methods of 
indemnification for damage.50 Article 1325 (ABGB), which was also 
cited explicitly by Dingli, is very important. This so called 
Schmerzensgeld dealing with bodily harm, has definitely existed since 
                                                                                                             
47.   That is, after the judgment has been delivered. 
48.    See Giuseppe Fenech v. Vincenzo Pace, Court of Appeal (Civil 1937) 
(per A. Mercieca, Rob. F. Ganado & E. Ganado). 
49.    And states as follows: “Damage is every detriment which has been 
caused to any person in regard to his property, his rights or his person. The loss 
of profits which a person expects according to the usual course of his affairs is 
to be distinguished there from.” 
50.   Article 1323 (ABGB) states as follows: “In order to make amends for 
damage caused, the damaged property must be returned to the former state 
(status quo) or, if this is not possible, the estimated price thereof must be paid. 
Compensation for only the actual damage suffered is called indemnity; 
compensation which includes lost profit and the elimination of all effects of the 
injury is called full satisfaction,” whilst Article 1324 (ABGB) states as follows: 
“In case of damage caused by malice or by gross negligence, the person injured 
is entitled to demand full satisfaction, and in other cases only indemnity. Where 
the general expression ‘damages’ occurs in the law, it is to be interpreted 
pursuant hereto.”ALLGEMEINES BÜRERLICHES GESETZBUCH (1811), available at 
http://www.ibiblio.org/ais/abgb1.htm (Last visited November 9, 2011). 




the origins of the ABGB, so the following applies in Austrian law today 
as it did at the time when Adriano Dingli was using it as a reference: 
A person who harms another person bodily shall bear the 
expenses of the cure of the person injured, compensate 
him for lost profits, or where the injured person is made 
incapable of earning a livelihood for the lost future 
gains, and moreover pay him at his request a 
compensation for his suffering, in accordance with the 
particular circumstances of the case. 
It is imperative to focus on the italicized words. It is clear from these 
words that Austrian law has always allowed “some form” of damages for 
suffering even though it must be said, it appears that “immaterial 
damage” is not generally compensated under Austrian law. That being 
said, certain damages for pain and suffering are actually allowed but only 
if the person responsible acted with intent or gross negligence, and if the 
law does not exclude compensation of non-economic damage.51 The type 
of “non-pecuniary damage” which is compensable is worth mentioning 
here. Such damage includes the so-called affection interest, the 
deprivation of the possibility to use a damaged or destroyed item of 
property, the loss of comfort and recreation, and finally frustrated 
expenditures.52 The question thus is self-evident: Why did Adriano 
Dingli seemingly and entirely exclude damages for pain and suffering? 
 Before answering this important question, we need to examine 
what was included in domestic Article 752 dealing with lucrum cessans 
(found in Article 1045 today), which must be read together with Article 
751 and in respect of which Article 1325 of the ABGB gains even more 
importance. 
 
B. Lucrum Cessans 
 
 Very basically, lucrum cessans is referred to in the law as being 
a loss of future earnings which must be a result of the permanent 
incapacity that which the act shall have directly caused. The Maltese 
courts have generally been more ‘liberal’ in respect of the lucrum 
cessans heading and it is here that they have sometimes taken moral 
damage into consideration–some in a more explicit manner than others as 
shall be seen below.53 
                                                                                                             
51.    As in Article 1330 of the ‘ABGB’ for example. Id. at art. 1330. 
52.    Inferred from the second half of Article 1331. Id. at art. 1331. 
53.    See supra Part II.A. 




 Article 752 of Ordinance No. VII of 1868 states as follows: 
Il danno pero` che dev’essere risarcito, da colui il quale 
lo abbia dolosamente recato, si estende, oltre le perdite e 
le spese menzionate nell’articolo precedente, al 
guadagno che il fatto impedisca al danneggiato di fare in 
avvenire, avuto riguardo al suo stato. La corte fissera` 
per la perdita di tale quadagno, secondo le circostanze, 
una somma non eccendente cento lire sterline.54 
It is apparent that for this type of damage to be recoverable, the person 
liable for its causation must have acted intentionally. It should be noted 
that the law was amended in 193855 changing this requirement and 
grouping lucrum cessans and damnum emergens into the same article.56 
It should also be stressed that, at least theoretically, the loss of future 
earnings can only be compensated if there is a permanent incapacity. 
Temporary disabilities (however long they may last) are excluded here, 
although from the Shaw v. Aquilina case discussed above, it can be 
deduced that any effect the temporary disability may have on one’s 
income until the date of the judgment should be recoverable under 
damnum emergens. 
 Another thing that must be noted is the fact that generally, what 
one is compensated for under lucrum cessans is the effect the disability 
has on one’s ability to generate an income and not for any effect of the 
disability on any other areas of one’s life (like harm to one’s feelings.) It 
is important for the reader to note that there have been several exceptions 
in this regard.57 
 Under Article 752, the legislator included a ceiling fixed for 
lucrum cessans and this was limited to £100. Thus, the approach of the 
                                                                                                             
54.    Basically translated as follows:  
However, the damage which must be compensated from 
whosoever caused it maliciously, extends in addition to the 
losses and expenses mentioned in the last preceding article 
(i.e., Article 751), to the future earnings which the fact 
(causing damage) prevents the victim from receiving, taking 
into account his state. The Court shall establish for the loss of 
such future earning, depending on the circumstances, a sum 
not exceeding one hundred sterling [£100]. 
55.    By ‘Ordinance No. VII of 1868 Amendment Ordinance,’ 1938–
(Ordinance No. III of 1938). 
56.    The modern Article 1045. MALTA CIV. CODE, supra note 9 & 28, at 
art. 1045. 
57.    See supra Part II.A.  




original legislator was to limit damages under lucrum cessans by linking 
this to “loss of income” (as opposed to “loss of enjoyment of life”) and 
also by limiting the amount that could be awarded in compensation. We 
shall examine the rationale for this in some detail below. The legal 
position was amended in 1938 due to an apparent change in mentality58 
and in 1962, the ceiling was removed completely59 so that the courts 
were free to award large amounts in compensation for the effects of an 
injury on one’s future earnings. The position today is that in all 
probability, a new ceiling will be imposed in the very near future (which 
seems to be around €600,000 according to current proposals).60 It 
obviously remains to be seen in what manner this will be applied and 
what effect it will have on claims for damages under Article 1045. 
 The main point here is that the lucrum cessans heading was 
always problematic–and remains so nowadays, despite the fact that 
certain cases attempted to create guidelines which might help the courts. 
Above, reference was made to the Butler v. Heard case.61 It is important 
to note that the appeal stage of Butler v. Heard (discussed below) 
effectively laid down a method of compensation which would be 
followed (albeit tweaked) by most judgments to this very day. It should 
also be noted that this method of compensation might be explicitly 
mentioned in the amendments to Article 1045 and 1046 of the Maltese 
Civil Code (henceforth referred to as the “Amendments”) which are 
currently being proposed.62 The basic workings of the “Butler v. Heard 
formula” used to calculate the lucrum cessans due have been included in 
rudimentary style as a footnote for the reader’s convenience.63 
                                                                                                             
58.   Reflected by the numerous cases that began exhibiting a change in 
attitude as discussed in the author’s LL.D. thesis.   
59.   By the Civil Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 1962–(Ordinance No. 
XXI of 1962). 
60.   See New Law to Remove Uncertainties on Compensation, TIMES OF 
MALTA, June 1, 2010, available at   
http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20100601/local/new-law-to-
remove-uncertainties-on-compensation (Last visited November 9, 2011).  
61.   See supra note 45.  
62.   As mentioned supra, articles 1045 and 1046 are currently under review 
and it is highly probable that they will be amended in the near future. An Act 
amending the said articles had already been passed by the Maltese Parliament 
(Act VI of 2004) but this never came into effect. Since these new amendments 
might be contained in other legislative instruments, it would be more prudent to 
await the termination of the consultation period currently underway before 
commenting in any detail on the said amendments. 
63.   The average weekly wage of the complainant is taken and adjusted for 
inflation. It is then multiplied by the number of weeks in a year and then 




 The Amendments in question would, among other things, 
introduce a set of “guidelines” which would help the courts adopt certain 
methods of calculating damages, as well as include a detailed table 
listing various percentages of disability depending on the type of injury 
sustained. The scope of such Amendments seems to be of aiding pre-trial 
assessments of particular disabilities and therefore facilitating out-of-
court settlements. 
 Alongside Ordinance No. VII of 1868 art. 752, dealing with 
lucrum cessans, Adriano Dingli wrote in his appunti: “Austr. L. c. con 
modif.” 
 Presumably, no specific article is cited because in drafting his 
own provisions on lucrum cessans, Dingli was looking at the Austrian 
provisions as a whole as well as the specific articles mentioned above–
particularly Article 1325 (ABGB). The content of Dingli’s Article 752 in 
fact, is taken from various Austrian provisions, some of which were not 
separated from the content found in Article 751 of the Ordinance. 
 It was Dingli’s modifiche that separated the concepts of damnum 
emergens and lucrum cessans into separate provisions and it was his idea 
to give them separate requirements. One would generally have had to 
verify whether the injury was caused intentionally or else through 
culpable negligence64 to see which provision applied. As noted above, 
the Austrian provision on methods of indemnification defines both 
damnum emergens and lucrum cessans in the same provision as being 
“indemnity” and “full satisfaction” respectively.65 
 It is clear that Adriano Dingli was very selective in transposing 
provisions from the ABGB into Maltese law. The only rationale Dingli 
gives for limiting the various provisions of the ABGB into just two 
domestic provisions and for limiting the amount that could be claimed 
                                                                                                             
 
multiplied by the percentage of disability caused to him or her (which must be 
permanent). The percentage is determined by asking a medical professional how 
far the disability has produced incapacity to generate an income and not how far 
it has affected his overall health. Finally, all of this is multiplied by the so-called 
“multiplier” (the number of years which the court predicts that the plaintiff 
would have continued to work). Usually this is taken to be the national age of 
retirement, but nonetheless a full multiplier is hardly ever given. This is the 
basic formula but there have been numerous decisions that altered or refined it 
(which go beyond the scope of this paper) including for example, deductions 
made for “lump sum” payments. 
64.   Which is not stated explicitly, but can be inferred from the general 
notions of tort. 
65.   See ALLGEMEINES, supra note 50, at art. 1323. 




under Article 752 dealing with lucrum cessans is found in his appunti 
where he states: 
I am including a limit of 100 (sterling) because 
otherwise, it might cause the (financial) ruin of the 
person causing the damage, whilst future earnings are 
subject to probability and might be lost from one 
moment to another for natural causes. The limit is a 
norm for the Courts in this entirely new subject matter.66 
Although Adriano Dingli only described his rationale for limiting the 
amount that could be claimed under lucrum cessans, one may infer his 
more general concerns as well. The first concern exhibited by Dingli is, 
“the (financial) ruin of the person causing the damage.”67 Dingli was 
hesitant to leave the amount of damages open-ended because this could 
lead to the financial ruin of the person liable to compensate the injured 
party. This is a fear that some bring to light to justify excluding open-
ended compensation for moral damage even today.68 
 His second concern relates to the fact that, “future earnings are 
subject to probability and might be lost from one moment to another for 
natural causes,” meaning that he feared cases of unjustified enrichment 
taking place.69 Since the future is uncertain, one could in theory, 
compensate someone for future earnings which might never materialise, 
thus going beyond the concept of restitutio in integrum. Of course, this 
may trigger a wider discussion on whether or not the possibility of such 
unjustified enrichment taking place should jeopardise the right to seek 
justice by opting for alternative means of compensation. 
 The third comment to reflect upon is, “this entirely new subject 
matter.”70 It seems thus, that Dingli decided to start slow and impose 
limits on this untested virgin law. Several years later, some cases would 
                                                                                                             
66.   Translated from the original Italian text: “Metto un limite di 100 
perche` altrimenti si potrebbe cagionare la rovina del danneggiante, mentre il 
guadagno futuro e` cosa di probabilita` e puo` mancare da un momento all’ altro 
per cause naturali. Il limite e` una norma alla Corte in questa materia tutta 
nuova.” 
67.    “ . . . la rovina del danneggiante . . .” 
68.   See Micallef-Grimaud, Excluding Moral Damages, supra star-
footnote, at ch. 4.  
69.    “ . . . il guadagno futuro e` cosa di probabilita` e puo` mancare da un 
momento all` altro per cause naturali.” 
70.    “ . . . questa materia tutta nuova.” 




quote Dingli and would even argue that he was correct in adopting such a 
careful approach.71 
 It is this author’s opinion that the omission of damages for “pain 
and suffering”—which was clearly intentional—was not a decision based 
on ideological incompatibility, but one based on practicality. In drafting 
the “unique” provisions on damages, Dingli chose a system of law that 
was similar to Malta’s at the time. Austrian law is fault-based just like 
French law. It is also made up of Roman law concepts, which still 
survive in Maltese legislation to this day. If Dingli felt that compensation 
for moral damage would not be compatible with Maltese law, he could 
have very easily excluded it explicitly. This author believes that Adriano 
Dingli’s limitations were merely a manifestation of initial hesitation; and 
that he probably expected further development of this dynamic branch of 
law. 
 The references to the sources of law are there to aid the courts in 
their interpretation of Dingli’s provisions. If the courts felt that 
compensation for “suffering” (which was in the original source of law) 
should have been interpreted in the words, “ . . . al guadagno che il fatto 
impedisca al danneggiato di fare in avvenire, avuto riguardo al suo 
stato. . . ,”72 what was there to stop them? Where does it say in the 
original law that moral damage should not be taken into account when 
calculating what is owed to the injured party? Certainly, there was never 
an explicit provision entitling such injured party to compensation for 
moral damage on a separate basis, but this cannot be interpreted as a 
defiant repulsion of the concept of moral damage. 
 
III. THE DICHOTOMY BETWEEN RESPONSIBILITY IN TORT AND 
DAMAGES UNDER MALTESE LAW 
 
 It may be argued that if compensation for moral damage was to 
be explicitly excluded from Maltese law, then Adriano Dingli would 
have worded the provisions relating to responsibility in tort differently. 
There would not have been the possibility of interpreting “damage” (in 
terms of harm done) to include also a moral damage. The problem 
however, is that this remains a plausible interpretation even to this day.73  
Above, it was noted how a recent judgment (which has been appealed) 
                                                                                                             
71.    See Fenech v. Pace, supra note 48.  
72.    “ . . . to the future earnings which the fact (causing damage) prevents 
the victim from receiving, taking into account his state.” 
73.    As explained in more detail infra. 




has proceeded to award compensation for moral damage on the basis of 
such non-restrictive interpretation.74   
 An important early case, which dealt with compensation for 
moral damage specifically, was the 1908 judgment Cini v. Townsley.75 
Our scope here is to examine what was said in relation to moral damage 
and its compatibility or otherwise with the wording of Ordinance No. VII 
of 1868 (which was illustrated in the previous section). This case dealt 
with an iniuria, which is a generic term derived from Roman law, usually 
meaning a “harm done to one’s honour or reputation” as examined by the 
author in other works.76 There are actually various types of iniuria, some 
of which were (and still are) regulated elsewhere in specific areas of 
Maltese law,77 and which also allow compensation for moral damage if 
certain conditions are met. Here, however, the type of iniuria being 
alleged was one caused by “parole ingiuriose e diffamanti all’indirizzo 
dell’attore tendenti ed atti a gettare discredito sul detto Royal Hotel 
(belonging to the plaintiff) e quindi a recare grave danno all’attore,” 
which fell under the “general concept of iniuria.”78 Since this type of 
iniuria was not regulated by any specific law, the claim had to be based 
on the general provisions of the Ordinance.79 
 The case is interesting because the claim made by the plaintiff 
explicitly lists moral damage before material damage in the demand for 
compensation despite the fact that there is no mention of moral damage 
anywhere in the Ordinance as drafted by Adriano Dingli. The Court of 
First Instance, commenting on whether it could grant damages or not, 
simply said that in addition to the fact that such moral damage was not 
proven, the action could not succeed because “ . . . our laws do not 
contemplate the ‘moral damage’ upon which the present case is based 
(Ordinance VII of 1868 art. 739,751, 752).”80 
                                                                                                             
74.   See supra note 40. 
75.   Michele Cini v. Ernest Townsley ed altri, First Hall (Civil Court 
1908).  
76.   See Micallef-Grimaud, supra note 33; Micallef-Grimaud, Excluding 
Moral Damages, supra star-footnote.  
77.   As for example, in the Promises of Marriage Law. LAWS OF MALTA, 
supra note 31, at ch. 5. 
78.   Which seems to have never been regulated by specific provisions of 
the Ordinance (or indeed the modern Civil Code). 
79.   Ordinance No. VII of 1868 arts. 739, 751, 752. 
80.   Translated from the original Italian text: “ . . . le nostre leggi non 
contemplano il danno morale sul quale e` basata la presente istanza.” Ordinanza 
VII del 1868 arts. 739, 751, 752.  




 Thus, the courts more than one hundred years ago, adopting a 
strict-interpretation approach, were citing the lack of a legal basis as the 
main reason for not compensating for moral damage in general (and in an 
explicit manner). Although the plaintiff’s claims were eventually rejected 
by the Court, an appeal was filed and the case took a very interesting 
twist when private international law was invoked by the Court of 
Appeal.81 
 At the appeal stage, the Court stated that the applicable law was 
not Maltese law but French law since the incident took place in the 
territorial waters of Tunisia.82 What the Court had to say in respect of 
French law is very important because it indicates to us whether Maltese 
courts, at that particular moment in time, were ready to reject or accept 
compensation for moral damage in general (not merely in cases of an 
iniuria) based on laws very similar to those found in Malta. The Court 
immediately pointed out that the applicable legal provision was Article 
1382 of the French Civil Code. The reader will remember from what was 
discussed above that this provision makes absolutely no reference to 
moral damage and is, ironically enough, a reflection of the Maltese law 
on responsibility in tort. Despite the similarities with the Maltese 
provision on “fault” (even to this very day), the Court quoted Aubry & 
Rau, and Laurent amongst others who state that “not only material 
damage is compensable but also moral . . .”83 
 The Court actually went on to determine the “extent of moral 
damage” that could be compensated for in this case and said that in 
calculating this, the Court had to carefully examine the gravity or 
otherwise of the effect produced by the damage in question.84 Although 
the Court decided that the moral damage in this case was not grave, 
(owing to the fact that the plaintiff’s business was not negatively affected 
by the comments made by the defendant), the Court nonetheless reversed 
the first instance judgment and proceeded to award five shillings as 
compensation for the moral damage suffered by the plaintiff. 
 This case is also noteworthy because the Maltese Court actually 
adopted an interpretation given to a foreign provision which is similar to 
                                                                                                             
81.   Michele Cini vs. Ernest Townsley Court of Appeal (Civil 1909) (per 
G. Carbone, G. Pullicino & A. Parnis). 
82.   Id. 
83.   “Secondo l’opinione piu` accreditata nella dottrina e nella 
giurisprudenza di quella nazione non solo il danno materiale, ma anche il 
morale e` risarcibile mediante un indennizzo pecuniario.” 
84.   “Nel calcolare l’estensione del danno morale devesi avere 
specialmente riguardo all’effetto piu` o meno grave che la causa che ve diede 
luogo e` atta a produrre e, nel caso, tali effetti sono minimi.” 




its counterpart in Malta. The only difference is that Maltese law does not 
stop at regulating responsibility in tort. Maltese law, to this day, also 
regulates the damages that can be awarded in what were then Articles 
751 and 752. In other words, moral damage was accepted on the basis of 
the French provision dealing with responsibility in tort because the 
Maltese Court appreciated the fact that moral damage could be 
reconciled with the wording thereof. So, the question is: “If Maltese law 
did not contain the articles regulating liquidation of compensation but 
merely those regulating responsibility in tort85, would the Court of First 
Instance have interpreted Maltese law in a similar fashion?”  
 In this regard, Professor V. Caruana Galizia believes that: 
[D]amage may refer either to the person or to the 
property, and according to the prevailing doctrine, which 
is based on the juridical traditions of Roman law which 
included defamation among private delicts, the damage 
may also be moral. This principle has been implicitly 
recognised by the judgment delivered by the Court of 
Appeal in re Cini v. Townsley, on, the 10th November, 
1909.86 
 This brief statement, which was not removed in 1978 by 
Professor J.M. Ganado in the revised edition of Caruana Galizia’s Notes 
on Civil Law, is very important. Caruana Galizia argues that what the 
Court of Appeal was saying in terms of French law, applies even to 
Maltese law by inference. He even mentions the juridical traditions of 
Roman law and indirectly cites the concept of iniuria as being applicable 
to Maltese law as well.  However, according to the findings of the thesis 
upon which this paper is based, a moral damage (or harm to one’s 
feelings more generally) only seems to be sufficient to give rise to 
responsibility in tort.87  
 When it comes to liquidation of damages, the Maltese courts are 
faced with provisions that were included by Adriano Dingli but are not 
found in French law. What is peculiar in Maltese law is that even though 
there seems to be agreement on the issue of responsibility, there is no 
corresponding provision in the Maltese Civil Code which explicitly 
entitles the victims to claim compensation in tort for such harm if it is 
purely a moral damage. In other words, a “moral harm” seems to be 
sufficient to find the culprit directly responsible in tort under the Maltese 
                                                                                                             
85.   Being almost identical to the French provisions cited in this judgment. 
86.    V. CARUANA GALIZIA, NOTES ON CIVIL LAW 312 (J. M. Ganado ed., 
1978). 
87.   See supra star-footnote and accompanying text. 




Civil Code but “Danni Morali” in terms of compensation, cannot be the 
sole basis of the claim–at least within the rigid confines of the law 
currently in force.88 In theory, thus, this discrepancy means that a person 
who causes a moral harm to someone, may be found responsible under 
Maltese law of tort, but in all probability (subject to possible exceptions 
as discussed above),89 such person would not be forced to compensate 
the victim(s) unless some sort of real or material damage is also caused 
or unless the issue is regulated by a specific branch of Maltese law 
outside the ambit of the Maltese Civil Code.90 
 In other words, it appears that the provisions regulating 
compensation under Maltese law actually restrict the more general 
provisions regulating responsibility in tort and actually prevent 
compensation for moral damage from being claimed explicitly under the 
former. The irony here is that French does not explicitly address 
compensation for moral damage, but since the French provisions only 
deal with responsibility, the problems that arise locally are non-existent 
in France. 
 It appears thus, at least in theory, that had Adriano Dingli 
omitted the provisions he modeled from Austrian law91 the Maltese 
courts might have been ready as early as 1909 to deem compensation for 
moral damage as being part of Maltese tort law. 
 
IV. SELECTED CASE LAW SEEMINGLY TAKING MORAL DAMAGE 
INTO CONSIDERATION 
 
 Due to length constraints, it is only possible to comment on a 
few cases here. These shall serve the purpose of illustrating certain 
“liberal” mechanisms used by the Maltese courts when compensating in 
tort. 
 The important 1952 case Victor Savona pro. et. noe. v. Dr. Peter 
Asphar, dealt with the amputation of a boy’s leg as a result of the 
                                                                                                             
88.   The very recent case Linda Busuttil et v. Dr. Josie Muscat et which 
was discussed above (see supra note 40) awarded compensation for moral 
damage to the plaintiff, partially on the basis of Article 1033 of the Civil Code 
(dealing with responsibility in tort) despite the content of Article 1045 (dealing 
with damages). However, it remains to be seen whether or not this judgment will 
be confirmed by the Court of Appeal. 
89.   Id. 
90.   See supra note 7. 
91.   And which the courts have applied in practice very much on a 
common-law basis as described above and as shall be seen in the next sub-
section. 




negligent medical intervention carried out by the defendant and the 
conclusions reached therein clearly indicate that every scenario has to be 
judged on a case-by-case basis. The Court of First Instance92 claimed that 
apart from the damnum emergens due as a result of the erosion of the 
injured party’s patrimony93 the plaintiff was also entitled to lucrum 
cessans. After several discussions relating to the percentage of disability 
that applied (a deficiency that has always beleaguered the Maltese legal 
system),94 the Court of First Instance went on to make it clear that under 
this category, one had to include also: “[T]hose damages due for the 
psychological insult of the loss of the leg, the inability of Victor Savona 
to go to school and his moral suffering when he sees, especially in the 
future, that he is always going to depend almost entirely on others.”95 
The Court of First Instance decided to award ₤650 as compensation 
under lucrum cessans and in doing so, it is clear that moral damage was 
taken into consideration. The fact that the Court could not award 
compensation for moral damage explicitly is obvious for the reasons 
stated above, but the Court nonetheless used the legal basis of lucrum 
cessans, and particularly the guidelines in what is today Article 1045(2)96 
to award, at least in part, compensation for what it called “moral 
suffering” and the “psychological insult” of losing a leg due to someone 
else’s fault.97 
 The Court of Appeal98 argued that there was no need to go into 
the issue of damnum emergens because these damages were clearly due. 
Similarly to what had been taking place up until then (and what generally 
happens today), the Court dealt with damnum emergens quite briskly and 
without complicating its calculations by including any novel concepts. 
 The reasoning of this judgment is very important because the 
Court of Appeal actually increased the amount of compensation due 
under lucrum cessans, and it did so predominantly on the basis of the 
                                                                                                             
92.   First Hall (Civil Court 1952). 
93.   Amounting to 132 pounds and 6 shillings. 
94.   See Josephine Anne Cini, Traditional and New Approaches to the 
Problem of the Assessment of Damages in Fatal and Personal Injury Claims 
(LL.D. thesis, University of Malta, 1997) (on file with the author).  
95.   “[D]awk (id-danni) dovuti għall-insult psikiku tat-telfa tas-sieq, l-
inkapaċita` ta` Victor Savona li jmur skola, u s-sofferenzi morali tiegħu meta 
jara, wisq iżjed ‘il quddiem, li huwa dejjem u f’kollox irid kważi jiddependi 
minn ħadd ieħor.” 
96.   Article 1088(2) at the time. 
97.   Through negligence. 
98.   Court of Appeal (Civil, Superior 1952) (per L. A. Camilleri, A. J. 
Montanaro Gauci & W. Harding). 




moral injuries and the pain and suffering caused to the plaintiff. The 
Court of Appeal started its reasoning by summarizing what is today 
Article 1045. Among other things, the Court commented on the fact that 
the maximum that it could now award as lucrum cessans was ₤1,200 
because the act was not intentional (in which case there would have been 
no capping).99 The Court also said that in exercising its arbitrary 
discretion, the Court should consider the circumstances of the case, the 
nature and degree of the incapacity, and condition of the injured party.100 
This reflects the wording of Article 1045(2), which is very important 
because these words served as the legal basis for taking into 
consideration several circumstances which had nothing to do with 
economic or material calculations. 
 The Court went on to trace the law’s development through time. 
It commented on Adriano Dingli’s appunti and illustrated his fears in 
respect of lucrum cessans.101 The Court pointed out that the 1938 
amendments were a reflection of the fact that times were changing and 
that the legislator felt the need to modernise the laws drafted by Dingli. 
The Court stated that this was justified due to the “augmented intensity 
of life” and the great burden on incapacitated persons who will likely 
lose more future earnings (and suffer a loss of their “purchase 
power”).102 
 The Court then invoked the maxim in probatione lucri cessante 
sufficiunt praesumptiones and went on to refer to English case law. It 
pointed out that in the case Philips v. London & South Western Rail 
Co.,103 it had been stated that: “Such damages cannot be a perfect 
compensation of the circumstances of the plaintiff and by making 
allowances for the ordinary chances of life.” In relation to an argument 
that rages on to this very day,104 the Court opined that fixed scales are 
not really possible in such situations. To give weight to this argument, 
                                                                                                             
99.   This capping was removed by the 1962 amendments. See supra note 
59. 
100.   “Fl-eżerċizzju ta’ l-arbitriju diskrezzjonali tagħha l-Qorti għandha 
tqis ċ-ċirkustanzi tal-każ, ix-xorta u grad ta` l-inkapaċita` u l-kondizzjoni ta` 
parti li tbati l-ħsara.”  
101.   Which were only limited to those cases involving dolo and capped at 
₤100. 
102.  “[I]ntensita` awmentata tal-ħajja, li minn naħa waħda timponi 
eżiġenzi akbar u kwindi l-inkapaċi aktarx jitlef aktar qliegh futur, u stante l-
“purchase power” diminwit tal-flus.”  
103.    5 Q.D. 78 (Court Appeal 1879). 
104. See Micallef-Grimaud, Excluding Moral Damages, supra star-
footnote, at ch. 4. 




the Court quoted Law Justice Scott in the English Court of Appeal case 
Bailey v. Howard105 who was of this same opinion. The Court then 
moved on to assess the amount of lucrum cessans due to the injured 
party in the case at hand, and determined that the defendant’s negligent 
act left the boy with a stump that could not be improved by benefitting 
from artificial limbs. Despite the fact that the boy had already been 
slightly incapacitated from birth, the Court said that the act of the 
defendant now rendered the boy a ‘hopeless cripple.’ The Court was 
clearly angered by the state the boy was reduced to, and it moved on to 
discuss the moral injuries at play by referring to the English case Heaps 
v. Perrite Ltd.106 
 According to what was common practice at the time (especially 
prior to the 1938 amendments), it should come as a surprise to many that 
a Maltese court would consider such things as “suffering,” both present 
and future, and such concepts as “the joy of life” which is a non-material 
consideration par excellence (not being easily quantifiable in monetary 
terms). Despite this fact, the Court in this case was ready to take into 
consideration the fact that the boy in question would no longer be able to 
ride a bicycle or kick a football; these are undoubtedly moral 
considerations. 
 It is also clear that the Maltese Court was not merely quoting a 
foreign case. In its own reflections on the case at hand, the Court did not 
focus on any economic losses per se or even the child’s earning capacity. 
It adopted the spirit of English case law and focused on the child’s ability 
to enjoy life. It said that following the defendant’s negligent intervention, 
Savona would no longer be able to do certain things like “play with 
                                                                                                             
105.   December 14, 1938, where Justice Scott said the following:   
. . . I see no means of arriving at any sort of quantitative scale 
for the guidance of judges and juries, except the gradual 
working out, chiefly through the common sense of juries, of 
the amount that in the civilization of today is regarded as 
reasonable for that particular head of damages.  
106.   Heaps v. Perrite Ltd., 2 All E.R. 60 (Eng. 1932), where it was stated 
that:  
We also have to take in consideration not only the suffering 
which he had immediately after the accident, but the suffering 
that he will have throughout his life in future, the constant 
necessity of having assistance in the carious things that he has 
to do for his own purposes, apart from earning money; also the 
fact that the joy of life  will have gone from him; he cannot 
ride a bicycle, cannot kick a football, he cannot have any of 
the forms of recreation which appeal to the healthy ordinary 
man . . .   




children and keep up with whatever he wishes to do.”107 Even in its 
closing arguments, the Court did not swerve into any specific economic 
considerations and made reference to the “ . . . opportunities which life 
has to offer healthy persons and persons who can keep up with life’s 
exigencies.”108  
 The Court then said that it also considered the amounts given in 
other local cases when the injury was of a far less severe nature.109 After 
considering all those facts, it concluded that the amount awarded by the 
Court of First Instance was too low and it therefore raised the amount 
due from ₤650 to ₤900 pounds. The total sum awarded was ₤1,032.60110 
and was perhaps one of the largest sums awarded in similar cases up to 
that moment in time. Subsequent cases would quote this judgment in 
justifying similar awards.111  The Court of Appeal used the legal basis of 
the lucrum cessans heading to compensate the injured party for the moral 
damage suffered. The Court also based its reasoning on Article 1088(2) 
(the modern 1045(2)),112 and it must have felt that the words contained 
therein were wide enough to include even moral harm as being one of the 
“relevant circumstances” which would help the Court reach an equitable 
sum to be awarded. 
 Another case that was decided on similar grounds to the above is 
the 1964 judgment Paolo D’Amato noe v. Joseph Ebejer.113 This case 
dealt with a “sfreġju,” or scar, caused to the face of the plaintiff’s 
daughter. Whereas in cases of unlawful deaths, the injured parties were 
being compensated almost exclusively on economic terms,114 in cases of 
this nature the Court stated explicitly that “one must not look (at the 
                                                                                                             
107.    “. . . jilgħab mat-tfal u jlaħħaq ma` dak li kien jixtieq jagħmel.” 
108.    “. . . l-opportunitajiet li toffri l-ħajja għal min hu b’saħħtu u jista` 
jlaħħaq ma’ l-eżiġenzi tagħha . . . ” 
109.   See Coppola v. England Sant Fournier (1944); Borg v. Bonnici 
(1948). 
110.    With relative interest payable at different rates. 
111.   See e.g., Carmela Fenech pr. et ne. pro et noe v. Antonio Galea 
(1956) (confirming several points made in this judgment). 
112.  Article 1045(2) of the Maltese Civil Code, which, as already 
illustrated above, states as follows: “The sum to be awarded in respect of such 
incapacity shall be assessed by the Court, having regard to the circumstances of 
the case, and, particularly, to the nature and degree of incapacity caused, and to 
the condition of the injured party.” MALTA CIV. CODE, supra note 9 & 28, at art. 
1045. 
113.     First Hall (Civil Court 1964) (per Edoardo Magri). 
114.    See among others, Emmanuela Galea pr. et. ne. pro et noe v. Paolo 
Gatt net, Court of Appeal (Civil, Superior 1958) (per A. J. Mamo, A. J. 
Montanaro Gauci & W. Harding). 




matter) merely from the level of incapacity to work but from the 
complexity of the consequences which the burns left on her person.”115  
 The Court then went on to say that certain other moral injuries 
must also be taken into consideration in such cases. The Court said that 
the burns on her face “ . . . created and will create in the future 
embarrassment and a sense of suspension and continual fear if she ever 
marries and gets pregnant.”116 
 The Court did not stop there. It further took into consideration 
the fact that it would be very hard for this girl to find a husband anytime 
in the future and, even if she did, she “ . . . would always be exposed to 
mortification and to certain disappointments that she will inevitably 
suffer when the poetry of matrimonial life is briskly interrupted with the 
discovery of these defects.”117 
 By mentioning such things as “the poetry of matrimonial life,” 
the Court clearly took into consideration the fact that this girl suffered a 
moral injury that would preclude her from enjoying such sentiments as 
“matrimonial bliss.” Similar to the Savona v. Asphar judgment which we 
saw above (dealing with the loss of a small boy’s leg), the Court went on 
to say that such injuries would also lead to certain men feeling 
“repulsed” by the image of the girl and that this certainly does not 
contribute towards the pursuit (and obtaining) of happiness, which the 
Court described as every human being’s prerogative.118 
 The Court said that this impediment to “the pursuit of happiness” 
or this “loss of enjoyment of life” would include also, a certain 
“embarrassment in society”119 and that all this “ . . . is an aspect of the 
damage caused which cannot be compensated within money.”120 The 
Court itself made reference to the Savona v. Asphar case which clearly 
dealt with a more incapacitating injury than a scar on one’s face. This 
notwithstanding, the Court decided that this case still merited a higher 
                                                                                                             
115.   “Wieħed m’għandux iħares lejha biss mill-grad tal-inkapaċita` għax-
xogħol, iżda mill-kompless tal-konsegwenzi deleterji li l-ustjonijiet ħallew fuq 
il-persuna tagħha . . . ” 
116.   “ . . . ħolqu u aktar joħolqu ‘l quddiem motiv ta` mistħija u sens ta` 
sospensjoni u ta` biża` kontinwu jekk tiżżewweġ u toħroġ gravida.” 
117.   “. . . l-għarusa tkun dejjem esposta għall-mortifikazzjonijiet u ċerti 
delużjonijiet li immankabilment ikollha tgħaddi minnhom meta l-poesija tal-
ħajja matrimonjali tiġi bruskament interrotta bl-iskoperta ta` dawn id-difetti. . .” 
118.   “. . . dan żgur ma jikkontribwixxi xejn fit-triq tal-prerogattiva li kull 
bniedem għandu versu r-riċerka u l-otteniment tal-feliċita` tiegħu fil-ħajja ta` 
kuljum.” 
119.   “mistħija fis-soċjeta`.” 
120.   “. . . huwa aspett ta` danneġġjament li ma jistax jiġi risarċit bi flus.” 




amount of compensation than on that occasion! Commenting on the fact 
that the two cases were different, the Court in this case awarded the 
plaintiff ₤1,000 as compensation under the “lucrum cessans” heading, 
which was ₤100 more than the Court had awarded in Savona v. 
Asphar.121 
 What must be duly noted in respect of the above is that it is 
actually quite rare for the Maltese courts to use such colourful language 
in referring to such moral considerations, especially post Butler v. Heard. 
However, it must also be pointed out that facial scars on female victims 
generally seem to trigger a sense of compassion which at times drives the 
Maltese courts to award compensation on the basis of innovative 
interpretations of Maltese law of tort.122  
The facts of the above-cited Butler v. Heard case are by now, 
well-known to most local legal practitioners and scholars alike. The case 
(as already mentioned above) dealt with a traffic collision between two 
vehicles–a car driven by the defendant (Heard) and a motorcycle driven 
by the plaintiff (Butler). As already mentioned above, the case is 
important for the way in which it liquidates damnum emergens under 
Article 1088 (today Article 1045), but more important when dealing with 
lucrum cessans because it is here where the courts had previously 
allowed themselves to be “liberal.” The interesting thing to note here is 
that as soon as the Court moved on to discuss damages due under lucrum 
cessans, which it defined as “by far the most important,”123 the Court 
started its reasoning by immediately referring to moral damage. As it 
turns out, it did this to be very clear that compensation in the case at hand 
was only due for pecuniary losses. This is how the Court interpreted 
Article 1088 (today 1045) at the time–perhaps restricting certain 
previous interpretations that might have included compensation for moral 
damage as seen above. The reader should, however, bear in mind that 
whilst the Court deemed the law not to grant the legal basis to award 
compensation for moral damage explicitly, it was in no way opposed to 
this ideologically. Actually, the Court went so far as to say that Maltese 
law is inferior to other laws that specifically allow for compensation for 
moral damage. To make it absolutely clear that the Court was not just 
quoting a foreign source to illustrate the position abroad, it went on to 
                                                                                                             
121.   Taking into account certain considerations like inflation. 
122.   See the very recent judgment Linda Busuttil et v. Dr. Josie Muscat et 
as discussed above, supra note 40, by way of example.  
123.   “bil-wisq l-aktar importanti.” 




express its hope that this branch of Maltese law would be reformed in the 
near future.124 
 In truth, the only reforms that were made since then were court-
driven developments in respect of breaches of human rights and 
legislative innovations in the realms of consumer law and intellectual 
property law more specifically.125 In terms of the Maltese Civil Code, at 
the time of writing, no legislative reforms have ever been made since 
then. What can be inferred here is that those individuals who oppose the 
introduction of compensation for moral damage (of whatever kind) in the 
Maltese Civil Code cannot use Butler v. Heard to boost their arguments 
because the Court made it quite clear that it favored its introduction. 
 The Court proceeded to comment on the relief felt by the courts 
following the 1962 amendments (which removed the capping of 
damages) and how the courts were at full liberty to attain justice in favor 
of injured parties or their families. After creating what is now known as 
the “Butler v. Heard formula” which the reader is advised to refer to,126 
the Court went on to reduce the amount awarded by the Court of First 
Instance but it nonetheless awarded ₤5,100–one of the largest amounts 
ever awarded at the time. 
 It must be noted that judgments delivered post Butler v. Heard 
have tended to focus more on the intricacies of the calculations to be 
made rather than introduce any new theories or novel interpretations.  
Having said that, although many cases do in fact seem to take such 
considerations into account when liquidating damages (some in a more 
explicit manner than others), the usual practice is to “disguise” any moral 
considerations by tweaking the formulae used127 for such calculations. 
The following case is an example of such reasoning. 
 The 1997 case Paul Scerri et pro et noe v. Tancred Cesareo128 
dealt with a serious permanent incapacity. The amount of compensation 
awarded in this case for the serious disability caused to the plaintiff was 
Lm80,888 (€188,418.35). As we find in other similar cases, the medical 
expert appointed to determine the percentage of disability and its effect 
on the victim’s “income earning capacity” in this case, drifted also into 
other considerations which the Court was unable to compensate directly. 
Among other things, the medical expert said that the injured party was: 
                                                                                                             
124.   “Ta’ min jawgura illi din il-fergħa tal-liġi tagħna ma ddumx ma tiġi 
kif jixraq riformata.” 
125.    As mentioned above. 
126.    See supra note 63. 
127.   Michael Butler v. Peter Christopher Heard, Court of Appeal (Civil, 
Superior 1967). 
128.    First Hall (Civil Court 1977) (per G. Valenzia). 




. . . grossly handicapped and will always have problems 
with walking, going up and down stairs, ladders, etc. . . 
he may find it difficult to find a partner and marry. His 
body image of a disabled person may cause 
psychological problems etc. 
These words indicate a rational analysis of the case under examination. 
Above, we have seen how in the past, such considerations were at times 
even undertaken by the courts themselves. In this case however, we see 
how difficult it is for the medical expert to determine what percentage of 
the disability will affect one’s income-earning capacity (as opposed to 
other areas of one’s life). Of course, philosophically speaking, one might 
question the rationale for distinguishing these two concepts at all. Why 
not compensate the victim for the effect the disability might have on 
other areas of his life–like the damage to his love life as mentioned by 
the medical expert here? Although the Court’s final calculations might 
seem to be by-the-book,129 it should be noted that it is always within the 
Court’s discretion to determine the components of the “Butler v. Heard 
formula” (which at the time of writing is still not legally binding on the 
courts). In deciding the “multiplier” for example, the Court quoted 
foreign commentators130 and despite the fact that the future is uncertain 
and includes various “vicissitudes of life,” the Court still came up with a 
thirty-five year multiplier, which is partly responsible for the scale of the 
amount due. It reached this figure “ . . . because of the circumstances of 
the case and of the incapacitated person.”131 This makes us understand 
how the courts will ultimately determine whether the compensation due 
is justified or otherwise depending on all the facts and circumstances of 
the case. 
 At first glance, one might think that in this case, the fourteen-
year-old boy struck by the defendant’s car (who suffered a serious 
disability as a result of the accident), was treated like anyone else, but the 
mathematics involved in the judgment should not distract us from the 
fact that the Court was well aware of the seriousness of the case. 
 As Lord Scarman stated: 
Knowledge of the future being denied to mankind, so 
much of the award as is to be attributable to future loss 
and suffering will almost certainly be wrong. There is 
                                                                                                             
129.   80 (wage per week) x 52 (weeks in a year) x 35 (‘multiplier’) x 60% 
(percentage of disability) x 20% (lump sum reduction) = Lm69,888 as lucrum 
cessans + Lm11,000 as damnum emergens = Lm80,888 (€188,418,35). 
130.    W.V.H. ROGERS, THE LAW OF TORT 228 (2d ed. 1994). 
131.    “. . . minħabba ċ-ċirkostanzi tal-każ u tal-persuna inkapaċitata.” 




really only one certainty: the future will prove the award 
to be either too high or too low.132 
The Maltese Court was willing to award quite a large sum of money 
despite this “uncertainty of the future” which the Court itself cited in the 
judgment. Can we confidently say therefore, that the boy’s suffering in 
general was not taken into consideration? 
 Although the previous judgment is a typical example of how the 
Maltese courts seemingly take moral injuries into consideration (i.e., 
indirectly), certain recent case law has re-ignited the discussion of 
whether or not compensation for moral damage can be explicitly awarded 
on the basis of Article 1045 of the Maltese Civil Code. The case Linda 
Busuttil et v. Dr. Josie Muscat et, which was already discussed above,133 
merits particular attention in this regard. In this judgment (dealing with a 
facial scar caused to a female victim as the result of an unsuccessful 
medical intervention), the Court awarded the plaintiff €5,000 purely on 
the basis of the moral injuries suffered by same. Above, it was already 
mentioned that this judgment is important in the manner in which it 
interprets the term “actual loss” found in Article 1045 to include also 
“non-patrimonial damages”–despite the fact that the Maltese courts have 
generally refused such interpretation. On this point, this author had 
already previously expressed views similar to those found in the 
judgment in question134 and hopes that the same will be confirmed by the 
Court of Appeal.135   
 The judgment in question is also very creative in the manner in 
which it resorts to EU law to obtain a remedy for the plaintiff. Very 
innovatively, in its deliberations, the Court said that the female plaintiff 
suffered a physical injury as well as an injury to her “psyche.” The Court 
observed that the “physical and mental integrity” of the person is a right 
enshrined in the Maltese Constitution, in the European Convention on 
Human Rights as well as in Article 3 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union (the “Charter”).136 The Court then argued 
that since the Charter has the same legal status as the Treaties of the 
                                                                                                             
132.    Lim v. Camden & Islington A.H.A. (1980) A.C., 183. 
133.    See supra note 40. 
134.    See the author’s LL.D. thesis, supra star-footnote. 
135.    An appeal was registered on December 16, 2010. 
136.    European Union, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, December 7, 2000, Official Journal of the European Communities, 
December 18, 2000 (2000/C 364/01), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3b70.html (Last Visited November 
12, 2011). 




European Union in Malta, the Maltese courts are bound to interpret 
Maltese law in conformity with the principles enshrined therein (despite 
the fact that the provisions of the Charter are applicable only when Union 
law is being implemented by Member States).137 This author commends 
the Maltese Court for entertaining such liberal interpretations in its 
deliberations but believes that the judgment is on more solid ground 
when discussing the interpretation of the terms “any damage” in Article 
1033 and “actual loss” in Article 1045.138    
 Very recently, there has been another interesting judgment139 
which has attracted considerable media attention.140 Although this 
judgment (which has been appealed141) does not explicitly veer into 
moral considerations per se, the fact that the Court awarded €1,250,000 
in compensation to the victim of the traffic accident in question142 as well 
as to the other plaintiffs (being members of the victim’s family), is 
noteworthy to say the least.   
 These recent judgments (which are not yet res judicata) indicate 
a certain willingness by the Maltese courts to compensate victims of torts 
and quasi-torts in a more comprehensive manner. However, it remains to 
be seen to what extent the above-cited Amendments will reflect such 
views. 
 
V. FINAL THOUGHTS 
 
 The uniqueness of Article 1045 emerges from the fact that unlike 
the Maltese provisions modeled on the French legal system143 the 
“damages” encompassed in the said Article were inspired by Austrian 
law, and whether intended or otherwise, function very much on a 
common law basis. Unless the damage inflicted (including moral harm) 
is one which falls within the classes of compensable damage under 
Article 1045144 then, despite the responsibility of the tortfeasor, no 
                                                                                                             
137.     Id. at art. 51.1. 
138.    See supra note 9 & 41.  
139.    Alexander Caruana et pro et noe v. Daniel Bonnici, First Hall (Civil 
Court 2011). 
140.    http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20110315/local/man-
disabled-in-accident-awarded-1-25-million-in-damages (Last visited November 
12, 2011).  
141.   An appeal was registered on April 4, 2011. 
142.   Who did not die but suffered one hundred percent disability. 
143.   In other words, the provisions relating to tort liability (which are 
rooted in the civil-law tradition). 
144.   Or Article 1046 dealing with damages when death ensues. 




compensation will usually be awarded to the victim. The nature of 
Article 1045 itself145 led to the Maltese courts’ hands being effectively 
tied for well over a century.146 It is only in certain instances that the 
courts came up with liberal interpretations of Article 1045 that allowed 
them to award compensation for moral damage.  In such cases, a strict 
interpretation of the law would seem to indicate that these are indeed 
incompatible with the provisions on damages.147 That said, without 
entering into the complex mechanisms for liquidating such damages in 
tort,148 since the dawn of the Maltese Civil Code, the courts may not 
have been explicit, but the pain and suffering of certain complainants 
was clearly taken into account when calculating the amount of 
compensation due.149 Another thing to note is that certain cases are 
generally dealt with in a particular manner. For example, cases involving 
an iniuria (or harm to one’s honour or reputation) are generally treated 
with added caution–perhaps owing to the serious damage such offense 
may lead to in a small territory such as Malta.150 Bodily harm inflicted on 
children is also usually tackled in a more sensitive manner, and the basis 
                                                                                                             
145.   The legal rationale of which was examined above. 
146.   Despite the amendments that took place in 1938 and 1962. 
147.  That is, both article 1045 as well as article 1046 of the MALTA CIV. 
CODE, supra note 28, at arts. 1045 & 1046. 
148.   Which is the subject of Fiona Cilia’s paper, included in this volume 
of J. CIV. L. STUD.  
149.   A prime example being the case Paul Scerri et pro et noe v. Tancred 
Cesareo discussed supra note 128. 
150.  See Perit Joseph Boffa v. John A. Mizzi, First Hall (Civil Court 2002) 
(per P. Sciberras) which granted the plaintiff Lm300 (€698.81) as damages for 
the iniuria against the memory of his late father. The Court reached this sum on 
an ‘ex aequo et bono’ basis, which indicates that the claim was decided on 
general principles of law rather than article 1045 of the Civil Code). The reader 
should note that there have been recent developments regarding this case. On 
November 22, 2011 in a Chamber judgment of the European Court of Human 
Rights in the case John Anthony Mizzi v. Malta (application no. 17320/10), the 
Court held (by a majority) that there had been a violation of Article 10 (freedom 
of expression and information) of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
The Court held that Malta was to pay Mr. Mizzi EUR700 in respect of 
pecuniary damage, EUR4,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage and 
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for compensation is often clearly based on moral considerations.151 
Another category of injuries includes cases of scars or disfigurement on 
young females which, as we have seen above, sometimes lead to rather 
innovative ways of interpreting Maltese law on damages in tort.152 
 It remains to be seen to what extent the above-cited Amendments 
will alter Article 1045 (if at all), and whether the principles outlined 




                                                                                                             
151.   As seen in Savona v. Asphar discussed supra. 
152.  As seen in Paolo D’Amato noe v. Joseph Ebejer discussed supra. See 
also, Peter Sultana v. Anthony Abela Caruana, Court of Appeal (Civil, Superior 
2002) (per J. Said Pullicino, C. A. Agius & J. D. Camilleri), which dealt with 
what the Court referred to as a “psychological injury” caused as a result of a 
scar left on the plaintiff’s face. 
